An increasing number of universities and research organisations are introducing internal evaluations which are often based on quantitative indicators. However, it is likely that a 'least evaluable unit' (LEU) exists in every research organisation, and that below this level many standard quantitative performance indicators no longer provide a valid measure of performance. In this paper, the LEU of a research organisation is identified by analysing retrospective performance evaluations at different levels of aggregation and enhancing their interpretation with the detailed knowledge of the organisation's senior manager. The main obstacles to further disaggregation below the LEU are that indicators lose their statistical validity because of low numbers of publications and that the performance of subunits cannot be independently measured. The latter phenomenon is heightened at the level of scientists because work roles emerged that further clouded the application of performance measures to individuals.
N MOST OECD COUNTRIES, increasing emphasis is being placed on greater public accountability of science, with a need to demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of governmentsupported research. A workshop held by the OECD in 1997 characterised recent evaluation of basic research as 'a rapid growth industry' (OECD, 1997, page 5).
The increased incidence of the external evaluation of universities and research organisations has triggered a specific adaptive response from the evaluated organisations, namely the growth of internal evaluations. Organisations increasingly mirror internally what is imposed on them externally. They apply the same measures they are judged by as an institution to their organisational subunits and even individual scientists.
Australia provides a striking illustration of this trend. A proportion (in the order of 5%) of the block operating grant allocated by the Australian Government to universities is earmarked for research and research training. Since the beginning of the 1990s this has been distributed via a formula. Initially this formula used only external earnings as the basis for allocations, but student and publication components were subsequently added. Many Australian universities now apply a variation of this formula to allocate funds internally to faculties or even to individuals (Anderson et al, 1996, pages 39-45; Marginson and Considine, 2000, pages 149-151) . This has occurred in spite of the fact that the formula was never designed for intraorganisational funding allocations (Strand, 1998) .
The adaptive behaviour of organisations appears to be a logical decision: if organisations internally mirror the performance evaluation that is applied to I them, it is rational that the subunits that contribute most to the organisation's performance according to these criteria should benefit most. The indicators' cost-efficiency as well as their apparent objectivity and comparability make them a seductive, ready-touse instrument.
There are significant dangers from this evolving practice of everyday quantitative assessment. First, the ideal practice of careful interpretation of the data gathered by discussion between evaluators and the evaluated appears to have become an exception rather than the rule. Second, these assessments usually rest on implicit assumptions about performance and performance indicators, assumptions whose accuracy may be questionable. Two of these assumptions, which are of special importance to organisations' internal 'mirroring' of performance measures, are scale invariance of performance indicators and scale invariance of performance.
With the concept scale invariance of performance
indicators we refer to the indicators' applicability at all levels of aggregation. Scale invariance is assumed when indicators that are applied to organisations are taken by these organisations and applied to departments, programs, research groups and individual scientists. In the case of bibliometric indicators, this disaggregation leads to ever smaller numbers of publications and citations, which at some point threatens the statistical validity of the indicators (Nederhof, 1988, page 207; Van Raan, 1996, page 403; Van Raan, 2000, page 309) . According to the experience of the Centre for Science and Technology Studies at Leiden University (CWTS), 10 to 20 publications per year (the usual output of a research group) are a sufficient basis for bibliometric evaluations, while 'a few publications per year' are not (Van Raan, 2000, pages 307-309) . To reduce the sources of error, the completeness of publication records is of utmost importance when lower levels of aggregation are targeted (Moed et al, 1985, page 198) . A second problem of indicators' scale invariance is attribution. At lower levels of aggregation, the basic means of attributing performance, such as the patent or the publication, more and more often spans the boundaries of the evaluated units. It becomes increasingly difficult justly to attribute the results of collaborative efforts to the units that took part in collaborations. Fractional counting is only a partial solution. It makes an adjustment for co-authored publications or patents so that these are not given more weight than single-authored publications, but it cannot account for the unequal contributions of authors to the collaborative effort. The quantitative measurement of outputs tends to obscure the importance of collaborators' actual contributions, which may lead to a levelling effect when all units under evaluation frequently collaborate with each other. Given the increasing climate of collaboration in science throughout the research sector, this problem is of growing significance. Bruin et al, 1993, pages 37-38) .
The 'service' groups appear to have contributed to the international impact of the faculty by their service rather than by their own output.
For these reasons, it is likely that a level exists in every research organisation below which disaggregation will cause the use of quantitative performance measures to fail. We call the smallest subunits to which the quantitative performance indicators can be applied the 'least evaluable unit' (LEU). Awareness of the organisation's LEU is of crucial importance. It is essential when quantitative indicators are used in funding formulas; that is, without further consideration by peers. But even when indicators are used 'only' to inform peer decisions, an awareness of the LEU remains crucial. While the knowledge and judgement of peers can overcome distortions of quantitative indicators, there can still exist a level below which their use becomes meaningless. This will occur if the data provided by quantitative measures is not systematically related to performance at all and could seriously 'mislead' evaluators. It must be recognised that below the LEU the assessment of a unit's performance should discard the use of quantitative measures and rely on alternative techniques. The aim of this paper is to identify the LEU of a research organisation by comparing retrospective performance evaluations at different levels of aggregation and enhancing their interpretation with the detailed knowledge of the organisation's senior manager. We chose to study a division of the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), which is Australia's largest publicly funded research organisation. The CSIRO's Division of Chemicals and Polymers, which we investigated, existed as an entity from 1988 to 1997 and one of the present authors was the chief of the division for most of its existence. Our search for a LEU in CSIRO's Division of Chemicals and Polymers applies a top-down strategy. We begin by characterising the division as a whole; that is, by describing its position in Australian chemical science and by characterising its performance according to our quantitative indicators. We subsequently conduct a stepwise disaggregation by repeating both characterisation and 'evaluation' for the subunits, namely programs, research groups and individual scientists. For each level, we will describe the importance of the administrative structure for the organisation's work process and picture working relations between subunits. We will then apply our performance indicators -that is, 'evaluate' the subunit's performance -and interpret the results.
Research object
CSIRO is Australia's largest and most diverse publicly funded research organisation. It has about 6,500 staff in 20 divisions (as at March 2003) who perform research and development over a broad range of areas of economic and social value.
The divisional arrangements change from time to time, depending on the needs of the economy and changes in science. In 1988, the research programs in organic, polymer and physical chemistry were consolidated into the Division of Chemicals and Polymers (DCP). The objective of the division was to develop new technologies to support the growth in Australia of the chemical, polymer, water and wastewater treatment industries that are competitive in domestic and international markets. The Division of Chemicals and Polymers as an organisational entity existed from 1 January 1988 to 30 June 1997. One of the authors of this paper was the chief of the division from May 1989.
In the peak year of 1992, the staff of DCP numbered 184, of which 49 were researchers and 87 project staff. The DCP was organised into programs, which consisted of research groups. The organisational structure was fairly constant, with one major restructure occurring in 1994. The restructure occurred after the completion of a major industryfunded project and the retirement of some key personnel. Its aim was to reduce the number of programs by consolidating the projects around the main industry sponsors.
In the mid-1980s the Australian Government made a decision to require CSIRO (and later other government R&D agencies) to obtain 30% of their budget from outside their normal allocation. The government gave the agencies a period of time to achieve the target. It did not decrease the allocation from the budget by 30%, instead allowing inflation to decrease the value of the allocation. The second change, which was a logical consequence of the first change, was to allow the agencies to retain all their external earnings. Previously, the government had required the agencies to return earnings to consolidated revenue. These two changes meant that the agencies had greater incentives to interact with the private sector to obtain research contracts and to provide research services. CSIRO increased its external earnings from 17% in 1987-88 to 33% in 1998-99.
The senior management of CSIRO devolved the responsibility for obtaining the required level of external earnings to the research divisions. Since some of the research divisions and the administrative units were less able to achieve the 30% target, other research divisions were required to achieve higher earnings. The DCP target was 30%, which it achieved by 1992-93 though total external earnings varied considerably from year to year.
The transition from an appropriation-funded institute to one with 30% external funding required considerable changes in the skill base of the division. Business development, accounting and commercialisation skills all needed to be developed in the existing staff or imported with new staff. The DCP used both approaches. Research staff had to be confronted with the demand to engage in industry-related work.
The DCP's management actively approached potential customers both in Australia and overseas in order to acquire contracts. Both program managers and business development staff were involved in discussions with customers and potential customers. Legal services were provided by the CSIRO corporate group or from external sources.
Data and methods

Data sources
The study drew together data from a wide variety of sources. Publication-based indicators were constructed from the Research Evaluation and Policy Project (REPP) database. The REPP database contains all Australian publications indexed in Institute for Scientific Information's (ISI) three main indices: the Science Citation Index (SCI), the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), and the Arts and Humanities Citation Index (A&HCI). The database is updated annually, and at the time this study was undertaken contained details of over 400,000 publications, covering the period between 1981 and 2000. It also contains yearly counts of citations received by each Australian publication, and the 'expected' 1 number of citations for each article.
One of the main problems in using ISI data for evaluations is that address data has not been standardised. While for an institution the level of error this can cause may be relatively low, it becomes a significant factor if the analysis focuses on a lower level of aggregation. There were 56 different variations of the DCP address recorded in the ISI database. Five examples are:
In order to improve the accuracy and efficiency of performance measures based on ISI data, all Australian addresses in the REPP database have been unified. Each variant of an institutional address has been identified and allocated one standardised address. In the case of CSIRO, addresses have been cleaned to the level of division, so all publications referring to the DCP in the address field have been identified, even where they carry an unusual address. This methodology enabled us readily to identify over 90% of all DCP publications. However, some addresses do not contain any information linking the author to a particular CSIRO division. These publiccations were identified during detailed interrogation of the database for individual scientists.
A great deal of financial and contextual information was obtained from archived records of the DCP. For individuals this covered their seniority and their period of employment in the division. Financial data covered details of all the external earnings of the division, including both consultancy and grant income. The detailed knowledge of one of the authors of this paper, on the work roles of each researcher within their group and the way in which industry funded projects were initiated, enhanced these data.
A list of all European and American patents granted to DCP researchers from CSIRO was obtained from divisional records. No details were sought on Australian patents as it is the institution's policy for all patents that progress past the provisional stage to be registered in the American and/or European Patent Offices.
Methods and indicators
An evaluation was simulated at each of the four structural levels of the DCP, namely the division as a whole, its programs, groups and individual researchers. At each level, activity indicators and performance indicators were applied. Our aim was to simulate a standard evaluation that may occur in the Australian science policy and management context. This means that the evaluators would use the REPP database and apply the indicators constructed on the basis of this database. We are aware that groups like the Centre for Science and Technology Studies at Leiden University (CWTS) have employed advanced scientometric indicators that take into account variations in publication and citation practices between fields (e.g. Van Raan, 1996) . But since the application of these indicators requires access to world citation data, they are too costly to be applied by most organisations. Furthermore, since these advanced indicators are similar to our measures in that they are also based on publications, one can expect similar problems of disaggregation.
From our data sources, we constructed the following activity and performance indicators: 2
• Publications The number of ISI publications published between 1988 and 1998 that were (jointly) authored by each scientist, group and program was extracted from the REPP database.
• Co-authorship linkages All co-authorship linkages were identified from the REPP database, including: internal linkages with other scientists in the group and/or the division, co-authorship links to other CSIRO divisions, and links with external organisations. The external links were further classified according to the type of organisation (university, industry, etc.).
• Patents All the patents granted in the USA or Europe were identified for the division, and disaggregated down to the level of program, group and individual scientist. Duplications (i.e. identical patents granted in both the USA and Europe) were removed.
• External earnings The external earnings received from industry projects were extracted from divisional records for each financial year (which commences on 1 July in Australia). In addition, information was extracted on the involvement of programs, groups and scientists in these projects.
• Number of years of externally financed work
From divisional records, the number of years each unit was engaged in industry-related work based on external funding was extracted.
One of the main problems in using ISI data for evaluations is that address data has not been standardised
• Researcher characteristics Contextual information on individual scientists was extracted from divisional records including: their seniority, from junior (equivalent of post-doctoral researchers) through mid-level to senior research scientists; and the number of years each researcher was on the staff of the division.
In order to gain a clearer understanding of the impact of the basic research undertaken by DCP research scientists, four measures based on citation counts were collated.
• Citation per publication The publications of each unit were tallied, and the citations each of these attracted from their date of publication until 2000 were counted. 3 A mean citation per publication rate was then calculated for each scientist, group and program.
• Fractional citations per publication Publications and citations were allocated to the units of analysis according to the proportion of authors from that unit. In the case of a group publication, if three of five authors were members of the group, then it was ascribed 60% of the publication and 60% of the citations it attracted.
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• Ratio of actual to expected citations In this relative measure, proposed by Schubert et al (1988) , actual citations refers to the number of citations actually achieved by the publications of the unit under study; and expected citations refers to the number of citations achieved by all publications of the same type in the journals publishing the articles of the unit under study.
• Highly cited publications and scientists ISI's Essential Science Indicators database was interrogated to identify any DCP publications or scientists that were ranked in the top 1% worldwide.
In order to assess the impact of collaborative relationships on performance evaluation, two additional indicators were constructed. At the level of the DCP as a whole, the number of collaborative links was calculated. In this calculation, we followed the 'online fractionation approach' proposed by Nederhof and Moed (1993) . Every publication that was co-authored by at least one partner from Australian industry, overseas industry, Australian research organisations or overseas research organisations counted as a collaborative link to this type of partner. Multiple co-authorships from one type of partner were counted as one. At lower levels of aggregations, the strength of collaborative links between the units evaluated were assessed by an indicator ownership ratio that was constructed as shown in Equation 1. This ratio describes a unit's relative ownership of 'its' publications and therefore its ownership of the performance as measured by publication-based indicators. It is as crude a measure as all the other publication-based measures (including fractional counting) because it cannot discriminate between contributions to the collaboration, treating each equally.
To demonstrate the embeddedness of evaluated units, co-authorship networks were constructed from the publication data. At first glance, this approach is similar to that of the 'co-author analysis' conducted by Peters and Van Raan (1991) . The authors applied cluster analysis based on publication thresholds and co-author strength in order to identify collaboration patterns in a university faculty. However, our aim is different insofar as we are not interested in patterns of collaboration but in the number and strength of a unit's collaborative relationships. Since publication numbers were rather low and the position of specific units in the networks was not relevant for the task at hand, neither thresholds nor relative measures of collaboration strength were applied. The pictures of networks are not based on multidimensional scaling or cluster analysis and are provided for illustrative rather than analytical purposes.
Analysis of the DCP
Divisional analysis
The first level of evaluation is the division as a whole, whose performance must be assessed in both the national and international context. Over 80% of the division's publications appeared in journals classified to the chemical sciences, and for this reason the analysis focuses specifically on that field. This enables valid national and international assessments to be made of the division's performance, by calculating citation per publications rates for all publications in journals classified to the chemical sciences ('world') and for the Australian sub-set of these publications.
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As Table 1 shows, the impact of DCP publications was very high. Since 1990, they have consistently attracted citations at a rate above both the world and Australian average, and from 1992 the difference has been significant. Six of the division's publications (or 2% of their total output) have been identified as falling in the top 1% of most cited chemistry papers worldwide. Fractional counting has little effect on the assessment of DCP's citation performance.
DCP had strong collaborative links to research organisations in Australia and overseas. Figure 1 shows these linkages as the shares of publications that were co-authored by researchers from other organisations.
Ownership ratio = Number of authors from all subunits Number of authors from subunit * 100
Equation 1 Co-authorship links to industry were low, primarily resulting from collaborations established during contract research. The extremely low number of coauthorship links to Australian industry (a total of three collaborative publications) indicates the weakness of the industrial research sector in Australia in DCP's core disciplines, which is due to the predominance of low-tech industries (mining and agriculture). This created problems for DCP, which were solved by actively approaching overseas enterprises.
The data show that the division met all performance expectations. External earnings from industry were significant. The division successfully established links to industrial enterprises overseas, thus compensating for the lack of potent domestic partners. Given that the division's main task was applied research, its success in basic research is remarkable. DCP was above world average and above Australian average impact throughout its existence, and repeatedly managed to have papers among the world's top 1%.
Program analysis
The Division of Chemicals and Polymers was organised into programs. Programs roughly matched areas of application in which DCP was active. The program structure was changed once in 1995. Tables 2  and 3 provide an overview of program performance.
At the program level we encounter the first technical difficulties with our indicators. Since the numbers of publications becomes small, it was necessary to aggregate the yearly data for the two phases. This results in the loss of time series data on publications and citations. A second problem arose because the money from industry contracts had never been assigned to the research groups that actually conducted the work, but was only allocated to the division as a whole. Since no internal splitting and distribution of money took place, researchers, research groups and programs who took part in an industry-linked research project could be linked only to the whole sum. At the program level and below, the money assigned to a unit no longer reflects earnings in the sense of a successful acquisition of contracts. Consequently, the indicator 'external earnings' cannot be used as a performance indicator at levels below the overall DCP description. Hence we switched to an alternative indicator, the number of years of externally financed work.
At the program level, collaboration between subunits has to be taken into account for the first time. While there is only a negligible number of inter-program co-patent links, co-publication links are stronger and may distort publication-based measurements.
Our 'ownership ratio' indicator shows that at the program level the intra-unit ownerships starkly exceed outside contributions. This observation justifies the assumption that the performance which is assigned to the programs is predominantly produced by the programs themselves. The increase in ownership ratios of the second phase shows that a consolidation of the programs was indeed achieved by the restructuring. Increased ownership ratios mean a better match of work relations and administrative structure.
All programs were engaged in industry-related research as well as more basic research. While positive correlations between patents and amounts of industry money and negative relations between patents/ 4.3 4.9 3.9 3.5 1 1.6 5 industry money and publications could have been expected, there is no clear pattern in our data. In the first period, the program with most patents and industry money also had the highest number of publications and the highest ratio of actual to expected citations. In the second period, programs VI and IX both show high numbers of publications, high ratios of actual to expected citations and similar amounts of industry money, but differ significantly in the number of patents. While a variation in the programs' performances is clearly visible, the picture drawn by the quantitative indicators does not in all cases agree with the evaluation by the division's head. The program that ranked lowest according to the citation-based indicators, had few patents and worked without industry money during one year (II), was actually a very good performer in application-oriented research. The reason why this did not show up in the performance measures is that, despite the very good collaborative relationships with industry, the industry partner did not always fund this work. In the second period, the program with the highest actual/expected citations ratio was actually regarded as contributing least to the DCP's overall performance, because the high citations were obtained by work that was not related to the other tasks of the program.
Group analysis
The programs consisted of two to four research groups. Except for the one change in the structure, the composition of research groups (and the composition of programs by research groups) was fairly constant. Tables 4 and 5 provide an overview of the performance according to the activity and performance indicators. Figure 2 shows the co-publication links between groups. At the level of research groups, a variation in industry-related work becomes visible: in the second period, one research group did not conduct work for industry and another was involved for only one year. With regard to the others, no conclusions can be drawn about their actual involvement in industryrelated work because the money was assigned on the basis of a group's participation independent of the strength of this involvement, and variations in the span of years over which groups conducted industryrelated work is low.
At the level of research groups, the problems of disaggregation become clear: some groups have so few publications that reliable publication-based performance indicators cannot be applied even when data are aggregated for several years. The extreme values of the relative performance indicators (actual versus expected citations) are based on relatively low numbers of publications. As for programs, the 'external earnings' indicator does not produce meaningful results because the money that has been earned by the division cannot be split according to the actual work conducted by subunits. The many collaborative publications, which make up all of some research groups' output, make it difficult to interpret the citation counts assigned to the groups. Table 6 shows the distribution of authorships for the period from 1988 to 1994. None of the groups had the majority of 'their' publications' authorships.
The ownership ratio of many groups is around 50% or below, meaning that the groups' papers have more authors from other groups than from the group itself. Similarly, strong co-patent links occur between some of the research groups (see next section). 
Individual research analysis
The final level of disaggregation is the level of individual researcher. We limited our analysis to the 30 researchers who have been with the DCP for all 11 years. This is not merely a matter of convenience (of reducing the amount of data) but is based on the assumption that researchers who have short-term positions are unlikely to be subject to a performance evaluation. In order to demonstrate the problems of applying the selected performance indicators to individual researchers, Figure 3 shows the copublication links with additional information about the number of publications (size of the circle) and the actual versus expected citations ratio (shade of grey). We have not identified the group to which each researcher belonged because to do so would have made it easy to identify a number of individuals, something we wished to avoid. Figure 3 shows a strong variation between the researchers according to all measures. Some researchers have not published at all or have published only very few papers in the 11 years of the division's existence. On the level of individual researcher, a variation in industry-related work also becomes more apparent. Some researchers were never engaged in industry-related work, while others (most of them) contributed to such projects over all 11 years. One of the most important observations, however, is that the co-publication links cut across most group boundaries, thus indicating that the actual work processes were largely independent of the group structure. Co-patent links span group boundaries, too, but to a lesser extent. This is partly due to the fact that patents had fewer co-authors than publications. Another reason is that groups were constructed primarily according to industry interests, which made collaboration in basic research span group boundaries more often.
To better understand the relation between the content of these researchers' work and our indicators, we used our knowledge about the fine-structure of the division's work and assigned work roles to the researchers. Our initial definition of work roles was stimulated by Stokes' (1997) work on the relations between basic and applied aspects of scientific work. Stokes regarded 'basic' and 'applied' as orthogonal dimensions rather than opposites and typified research according to its location on those dimensions (Figure 4) .
We interpreted the three meaningful quadrants as referring to work roles, which led to the following definitions:
• Bohr role (B in Table 7 ): conducting work that is pure basic; that is, that has no pre-identified application.
• Pasteur role (P in Table 7 ): conducting work that Some groups have so few publications that reliable publication-based performance indicators cannot be applied even when data are aggregated for several years Ia  29  127  43  10  74  Ib  30  117  32  31  54  Ic  11  58  11  22  25  Id  31  138  31  54  53  IIa  34  136  41  37  58  IIb  18  69  29  3  37  IIIa  10  42  11  11  20  IIIBb  12  54  13  8  33  IIIc  1  3  1  1  1  IVa  34  123  41  33  49  IVb  34  138  34  51  53  IVc  16  71  23  22  26  IVd  28  123  28  35  60  Va  11  41  13  10  18  Vb  2  10  4  3  3  Vc  5  18  5  0  13  Vd  4  19 Numbers in the circles refer to the scientists' codes in Table 7 15 24 Table 7 ): conducting work that is applied in nature; that is, directed towards identified applications.
These work roles were assigned to the DCP's researchers by the expert without taking indicators into account. To assign the roles turned out to be difficult in several cases. One obstacle was that a significant number of researchers could not be regarded as pursuing their own research agendas in any of the three roles. They made important contributions but worked on projects that were mainly defined by others. To catch this important difference, it appeared necessary to include a fourth work role, which we termed after a discussion in science studies as:
• Ortega role (O in Table 7 ): conducting work whose aims are set by other scientists, their main function being to support the work of these scientists.
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A second problem was that some scientists appeared to have more than one role. This is quite clear in the case of the Ortega role, which represents a dimension of scientific work that is different from the basic and applied dimensions. Scientists who were categorised as Ortega scientists still had to be categorised according to the basic/applied work roles because they supported work that belonged in these categories. There was no 'pure' Ortega role. Scientists could be categorised as either Pasteur/Ortega or Bohr/Ortega or Edison/Ortega scientists. Besides this double categorisation, or rather a specification of Ortega roles, there were true role splits. Some scientists were primarily interested in basic research but simultaneously had to fulfil the Division's demands for industry-related work. While these two birds can be caught with one stone in the case of Pasteur's Quadrant, not all basic research can be linked to contexts of application (Gläser, 2000) . If the demands or wishes for both basic and applied research cannot be easily reconciled by selecting a suitable topic, scientists tend to resort to a role split by pursuing thematically separate lines of basic and applied research. This was the case for two scientists in our sample who were thus classified as Bohr/ Edison scientists. Table 7 shows the 30 scientists with their role classification and the performance indicators over the 11 years. Table 7 shows some interesting irregularities that would affect evaluations. One of the 'Pasteur' scientists (4), who ranked high on all indicators and even had three patents, never worked in projects that were externally funded by industry. The reason is that his work was 'pioneering' in the sense that he was creating completely new applications from basic science; that is, application opportunities for which an industry partner had not yet been identified. The division decided to fund this work itself, in order to build up a significant patent portfolio. Their decision was vindicated, as significant industry funding was obtained some years later. This occurred with other scientists as well but was masked here by the fact that these scientists worked at least for some time in industry-financed projects. In one case, the division developed a patent portfolio around an invention and has subsequently spun off a company to exploit the technology.
Another interesting point is the lack of any patents for one 'Pasteur' (11) and one 'Edison' (12) scientist who were involved in a major invention that led to significant external earnings for the division . The reason for this is that the inventions of these scientists (who collaborated in industry-related projects) were protected by trade secrets rather than patents. Even if trade secrets are measured in performance evaluations, they are even less 'convertible' into quantitative measures. While in the case of inventions a connection between the invention's importance and the number of patents that protect it may be assumed, there will always be only one trade secret. These cases demonstrate the limited validity of activity indicators for applied research. Neither patents nor industry contracts depict all forms of application-oriented research.
Finally, there appear to be two scientists in our sample who have done nothing all the time (29 and 30). These 'Ortega/Edison' scientists did not publish (1 and 0 publications respectively) had no patents and did not work in industry-financed projects. These scientists were providing analytical services to various projects. Their contributions were acknowledged in publications but were not considered significant enough to have co-authorship of the papers.
Discussion
The set of indicators applied in our simulated evaluation confirmed the high esteem in which the Division of Chemicals and Polymers was held within CSIRO, in both basic and applied research. While one can always argue that the same performance could have been achieved with fewer personnel, this argument does not carry too much weight as long as the expectations of the organisation are met. The DCP is well integrated in national and international science, which is expressed by the collaborative links. This external integration poses no problems for evaluations as long as the overall performance is high. If this was not the case, the question might be asked whether this was due to a wrong choice of partners for collaborations.
The stepwise disaggregation of our data and simulated evaluation of subunits led to the two types of problems identified in the literature. At the level of programs, publication numbers became so small that only an aggregation over several years could secure the validity of publication-based indicators. This was not a major problem because performance evaluation should always include measurements from several years. One important indicator (external earnings) could no longer be used because initiating and maintaining relations with industry partners was an activity of DCP as a whole, and these earnings were not split between DCP's subunits according to the actual amount of work dedicated to the projects. We substituted it with the number of years the unit worked in externally funded projects, but this indicator did not discriminate between the units. Furthermore, inter-unit collaboration began to occur at the program level but this was not frequent enough to cause a breakdown of indicators.
At the group level, most indicators no longer provided a valid performance measurement. The numbers of publications became so small that even with the aggregation over the whole time of a group's existence (seven and four years respectively) an application of publication-based indicators was no longer possible. It is important to note that this is not due to difficulties in performing the calculation. While all the performance measures could be calculated in a technical sense, they were no longer valid because the numbers we calculated could no longer be systematically linked to a notion of performance. But the most important observation was that there was no justification for assigning publications (and thus citations to these publications) to a particular subunit from among those evaluated. In all cases, the majority of authors of a group's oeuvre were not members of the group itself. Even when authors who At the group level, most indicators no longer provided a valid performance measurement were external to DCP were disregarded, the fact remained that in many cases more than half of the authors were members of other groups; groups that were likely to be benchmarked against each other in an evaluation.
The co-publication networks demonstrated that most of the groups (in fact, all groups that published significantly) were integrated in a dense network of collaborative relationships. These relationships can be assumed to cause transfer effects because publiccations and citations are assigned equally to collaborators in spite of the differences in contributions, which may be significant. For example, a group can do very well in an evaluation if it has made many insignificant contributions to important (highly cited) papers. Our tests demonstrated that this problem cannot be overcome by fractional counting of publications or citations. Fractional counting loses its discriminating power whenever the proportion of single authored publications is very small (as is the case in DCP). Moreover, fractionation cannot overcome transfer effects because it is also bound to treat all co-authors equally.
Thus, our conclusion is that while an evaluation of programs was possible without significant difficulties in applying or interpreting our indicators, an evaluation of groups would have led to major difficulties due to problems of small numbers and problems of (non-) scale invariance. We therefore regard the program as the LEU in our case. The contradictions between outsider and insider assessment of quantitative performance descriptions make clear that even at the LEU level, an evaluation that does not include an expert's interpretation of the quantitative measures would have led to wrong conclusions. Possibly owing to the complex nature of the DCP's work processes, it can be assessed only by an indicator-assisted evaluation. Purely quantitative approaches such as formula-based funding would be dangerous in such a case.
We could have ended our disaggregation process at the level of groups because there was a clear indication that the indicators did not work any more. In order to reveal the fine structure of scientific work, we continued the disaggregation. At the level of individual researchers, a variation in work roles and in contributions to collaborations became visible. Scientists differed with regard to their basic versus applied work roles, with regard to their active versus supportive role, and with regard to the extent to which the content of their work could be measured by the indicators we applied. The work roles we could assign to individual researchers demonstrated that, on the basis of the long-term stable existence of a research organisation, specialisation, division of labor and collaboration patterns emerge, which cannot be depicted by quantitative performance evaluations. One important observation was that, judged by the indicators employed in this analysis, some scientists apparently didn't work at all. The division of labor within DCP was at least partly a division between visible and invisible work, invisible at least to our indicators. To supplant all scientists occupying supporting work roles by scientists who adhere to the 'creative leader' role model might lead to an undersupply of supportive work that is necessary for others' successes, as the following quote from an interview with a scientist at a German university indicates:
Unfortunately, my colleague has no permanent position but is forced to produce scientific results in order to get a permanent position in the future. That means that he cannot devote himself to the supervision of the equipment to the extent that one would wish as a user. (translated from Laudel, 1999, page 202) Finally, we would like to comment on the Ortega hypothesis. While it is apparently difficult to confirm or disprove the Ortega hypothesis by investigating the published literature, interesting observations can be made below the level of bibliometric visibility. From the performance evaluation perspective, one could ask whether scientists in supportive roles should be financed at all. The experience of the DCP shows that there are roles in scientific work that require scientists (i.e. workers who are not purely technical) but also require supporters rather than leaders. While it is generally not feasible, let alone desirable, to pre-define such roles when scientists are to be hired, their emergence in everyday work may well be a performance-enhancing factor.
Conclusion
The main difficulty in determining an organisation's LEU is that there will always be at least some indicators that produce numbers. Quantitative (and especially publication-based) indicators are technically applicable even when the resulting numbers can no longer be consistently interpreted. Technical procedures rest on the assumption of units that perform in isolation and whose performance therefore can be assigned to them in an unproblematic manner. Whenever this assumption is wrong, indicators can Fractional counting loses its discriminating power whenever the proportion of single authored publications is very small; moreover, fractionation cannot overcome transfer effects because it is also bound to treat all co-authors equally 'misinform' evaluators. That does not mean that there is a wrong choice of indicators. While there are certainly more sophisticated indicators than the relatively easy-to-use ones applied in this study, our point is not that there is a 'true performance' out there which can't be measured solely by the indicators at hand. Our results show that there is a level of (dis)aggregation at which the concept of a unit's separate performance is either principally different from the concept that can be applied at higher levels (as in the case of a shearers brigade's cook), or meaningless because performance can only be attributed to some larger system (as in the case of three people carrying a piano).
The problem of disaggregating performance measures is related to what Simon (1962) has described as the 'near decomposability' of a system. 'Near decomposability' exists when intra-component-links are generally stronger than inter-component links (Simon, 1962, pages 473-477) . According to Simon, organisational hierarchies are possible only under conditions of 'near decomposability'. We can now add that only under these conditions can performance measures be applied to the components; that is, at lower levels of aggregation. We used the 'ownership ratio' as an indicator for the relations between interunit and intra-unit links. While it appears impossible to define a threshold below which the application of publication-based indicators must be regarded as problematic, it is likely that a drop in this ownership ratio from more than two thirds to the 50%-level (as occurred when we went from program to group level) indicates that the disaggregation has moved below the level of the LEU.
